Unresolved scientific questions, remaining ten years after the anthrax attacks, three years after the FBI accused a dead man of perpetrating the 2001 anthrax attacks singlehandedly, and more than a year since they closed the case without further investigation, indictment or trial, are perpetuating serious concerns that the FBI may have accused the wrong person of carrying out the anthrax attacks. The FBI has not produced concrete evidence on key questions:
• How and why did the spore powders acquire the high levels of silicon and tin found in them?
The FBI has repeatedly insisted that the powders in the letters contained no additives, but they also claim that they have not been able to reproduce the high silicon content in the powders, and there has been little public mention of the extraordinary presence of tin. All the available evidence can be explained by the hypothesis that the spore coats were silicone-coated using a tin catalyst. Chemical details are presented here.
• Where did the anthrax spores become contaminated by a rare strain of B. subtilis?
The FBI never located the source of the strain, but they never searched in the most likely places.
Once the method of preparation of the attack anthrax is understood, the questions of who made it, and where, will be rapidly resolved. The publicly-known evidence related to these questions is compiled here, with full documentation.
Ì ntroduction
On August 6, 2008 the FBI announced its conclusion that Bruce Ivins, a scientist at the US Army Research Institute for Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID), was the sole perpetrator of the 2001 anthrax letter attacks. Nine days earlier, Ivins had killed himself. The FBI's announcement met with widespread doubts among scientists and other experts who considered the evidence to be, at best, highly circumstantial. The doubts remain in spite of subsequent FBI briefings and document releases. In September 2008 the FBI issued a formal request to the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to conduct an independent review of the scientific approaches used during the anthrax investigation. Before that review had been completed, the FBI formally concluded its investigation and released an "Amerithrax Investigative Summary" on February 19, 2010. The NAS committee issued its Report on Feb. 15, 2011, after two delays and an additional meeting at the FBI's request. When the NAS Report came out the FBI released some 10,000 pages of scientific documents, much of which consisted of plans and reports of laboratory work on unidentified, coded materials. By agreement, all the information that had been available to the NAS committee is now in the public domain. The major finding of the committee, which had no access to classified information, was "It is not possible to reach a definitive conclusion about the origins of the B. anthracis in the mailings based on the available [to them] scientific evidence alone"
1 . Perhaps their most celebrated finding is that "the scientific link between the letter material and flask number RMR-1029 [located in Bruce Ivins' laboratory at USAMRIID] is not as conclusive as stated in the DOJ Investigative Summary" 2 .
Observations Potential production sites of the attack anthrax
Genetic evidence from the attack anthrax itself is the prime indicator of laboratories at which genetically-matching B. anthracis could have been accessed for growing the spores sent in the letters. The spores were found to be Ames-strain B. anthracis and to include multiple colony morphotypes, some apparently unique. The latter provided the basis for four specific molecular assays that were developed for use as indicators of close relationship to the anthrax in the letters 3 . The FBI assembled a repository 4 (likely incomplete 5 ) of 1070 Ames-strain B. anthracis samples from 17 laboratories that were identified as possessing that strain. Assays on 947 of the repository samples 6 detected samples from 10 laboratories that tested positive in one or more of the specific assays 7 . Eight samples from two laboratories were positive in all four assays: seven samples from USAMRIID (which possessed flask RMR 1029, an Ames-strain B. anthracis spore preparation later shown in genetic tests to be indistinguishable from the attack anthrax) and one sample from Battelle Memorial Institute (BMI) in Ohio 8 (which had been sent samples from flask RMR 1029 on May 8 and June 18, 2001) 9 . Samples with partially-matching assay results cannot be disregarded, for a variety of reasons including variability in the assay results 4. The FBI issued a subpoena in February 2002 requiring submission of samples from "each distinct B. anthracis Ames strain stock in your possession, which differs in source or in other parameters prescribed by the requesting agency" (no other parameters are mentioned in the documents). Both institutional and personal inventories were covered (NAS Report, p. 105; FBI "Supplemental Documents:" "Preparing and Shipping TSA Slants for B. anthracis Ames").
5. NAS Report pp. 104-107 and 119. The Report notes that the repository was unlikely to have been comprehensive because of uncertainty in whether all Ames-strain possessors had been identified, the lack of specificity in the subpoena protocol, uncertainties in compliance with the protocol, incomplete information on Ames-strain transfers between laboratories, the possibility that some stocks had already been destroyed in the months before the FBI sent its subpoena, and because repository collection was based on the integrity of those asked to provide samples rather than on standards of custody or evidence (which would have required that FBI agents collect the samples).
6. Eleven repository samples were not viable, and 112 samples gave inconclusive assay results, which were discarded (NAS Report, pp. [109] [110] of repeat analyses, false negatives, and the fact that, prior to assay, each sample had been through two rounds of cultivation 11 . Among the eight laboratories that submitted a total of 63 samples with 1-3 positive assay results 12 are: Dugway Proving Ground, the Naval Medical Research Center, Northern Arizona University, the Canadian Defense Research Establishment at Suffield (DRES) 13 , and a second sample from Battelle 14 . The submitters of the other three samples have not been revealed.
A priori, the most likely sites of production of the letter anthrax are laboratories that work with dry spores: Battelle, Dugway, and DRES, and their associated institutions and subcontractors. Battelle, for example, is well-known for its aerosol study capabilities and biodefense activities, for which dry spores are routinely needed 15 . USAMRIID, on the other hand, has always insisted that dry spores are never used in the work there. The FBI says that, prior to the attacks, no US laboratory had Ames anthrax spores in powder form 16 ; however, powdered anthrax spores are known to have been produced at Dugway in the last few years before the attacks 17 . The FBI recognized that Dugway had the know-how 18 , and also, the strain-Dugway had produced the bulk of the B. anthracis in USAMRIID's flask RMR 1029 in 1997
19
. Furthermore, Battelle has an operation at Dugway and some other government locations 20 , and might have transferred material there. Also note that, according to the US Department of Justice, "Upon the receipt of RMR-1029 spores, the private research laboratory [defined earlier in the same document as "a private laboratory operated by Battelle"] was allowed to provide aliquots to other laboratory facilities for legitimate research purposes 21 ".
The FBI ruled out Battelle as the source of the attack anthrax on the implicit, and unwarranted, assumptions (1) that the anthrax spore preparations in the letters must have been made covertly, and (2) made by the perpetrator(s) of the attack. They say that every minute in the "Midwest" Battelle laboratory is accounted for, and no researcher was ever alone in the laboratory; background investigations of everyone who had access to the RMR 1029 material received from USAMRIID gave unremarkable results; and the great distance of the Battelle laboratory in Ohio from Princeton, NJ, where the anthrax letters were mailed, "preclude any reasonable possibility that the mailings came from there 22 ". Dugway and DRES, being much farther from Princeton than Battelle, may have been eliminated on that basis alone. However, there is no publicly available information to rule out the possibility that the anthrax spores in the letters were made somewhere in the normal conduct of authorized laboratory operations, and later acquired by the mailer(s) at the same or some other location.
The FBI has also routinely assumed 23 (3) that the attack spores were prepared during the short interval between 9/11 and the mailings of the letters on Sept. 18 it. The FBI cannot point to specific equipment, facilities or materials that would have been needed at the site(s) where the spores were produced, or the time required for their production; in communicating with the NAS Committee, the FBI hedged on all these aspects of the production process, indicating uncertainty while seeming to know more than they were willing to reveal 32 . They did not tell the Committee the scientific rationale for the choice of the various surrogate preparations studied, and would not divulge the preparation procedures for some of the preparations. Perhaps the motive was to protect proprietary defense information; nonetheless, the lack of information raises questions about the adequacy of the investigation. The NAS Report recommended that a review should be conducted of all classified materials that are relevant to the investigation 33 .
Regarding potential production sites, the FBI has not scrutinized the most significant aspects of the attack anthrax preparations; namely the silicon and tin levels and B.subtilis contaminant (discussed in the next two sections). On the basis of these aspects, as well as on purity, the powders in the first batch of letters (sent to the New York Post and Tom Brokaw) are markedly different from the powders in the two Senate letters, mailed later. These differences strongly suggest that there were two different production runs, and that, instead of making the anthrax themselves, the perpetrator(s) probably took advantage of alreadyexisting materials that had not been made for the purpose of terrorism. The obvious differences in quality suggest that there had been a review of quality control procedures involved at some stage in the production of the powders.
Silicon and tin additives in the attack letter powders
Silicon 34 has been recognized as a "key component 35 " of the attack anthrax from the beginning 36 , although there has been much controversy over its nature and purpose. The presence of silica (SiO 2 ) nanoparticles, classically used to increase the dispersibility of biological agents, was eventually ruled out. Six months after the attacks, an unusual chemical was said to be found in the letter spores 37 , and in November 2003 the journal Science published an article claiming the spores contained a "polymerized glass" component -a silane or siloxane compound that "leaves a thin glassy coating 38 ". This information was said to have been provided by US Intelligence to officials of two NATO countries. Richard Spertzel, former Deputy Commander of USAMRIID and Senior Biologist of the UN Special Commission for Iraq, later confirmed that this was known to the German Foreign Ministry 39 . At the end of this section we propose a process, consistent with all the known evidence, by which the attack spores may have been given a polysiloxane (silicone) coating using a tin catalyst.
An ongoing concern of the FBI may have been to protect what may originally, before all the leaks and speculations, have been valuable security information about anthrax spore preparation. In an August, 2006 scientific article by an FBI scientist 42 , ostensibly about the procedures used to search bags of Congressional mail, a carefullyworded paragraph was inserted to imply, once again, that the attack anthrax consisted simply of spores, without additives, and was not weaponized. The article was widely touted as "the most expansive public comment on the nature of the powder by any FBI official 43 . " When the scientific journal printed a reader's letter objecting to the absence of Citation: Hugh-Jones ME, Rosenberg BH, Jacobsen S (2011) 54. Michael and Kotula (op. cit.) did at one point present closely similar weight-percentages of silicon for Leahy (1.2 -2.3%) and NY Post (1.2 -1.5%) samples, but the details of their work indicate that the measurement had focused on part of an aggregate of spores in the NY Post sample (which, they note, "consisted mainly of larger aggregates" but also contained vegetative and sporulating cells) (FBI document B1M6, pp. 25-28); therefore, the reported silicon percentage was not representative of the bulk sample as a whole. See also the later discussion herein of "larger pieces" reported by the AFIP.
55. NAS Report, p. 6; see also p. 68, where the NAS seems confused about the data.
56. Weber P, Viani B, Davisson L, Velsko S, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, presentation to the NAS Committee, "Nanometer-scale secondary ion mass spectroscopy for microbial characterization," September 25, 2009 (available from the National Academies' Public Access Records Office). the B. anthracis Ames spore samples sent to them by the FBI 59 (other than the attack samples) had either no silicon in their spore coats or considerably lesser amounts, and a much smaller fraction of spores that contained any silicon 60 . In surrogate samples containing silicon, according to Sandia, "the details are different. "
The Lawrence Livermore group was sent
In an effort to 'reverse engineer" the attack anthrax, the FBI had asked Dugway early on to make 36 surrogate spore preparations by various methods
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. Bulk elemental analysis was carried out by the FBI in 2002 62 on only ten of these surrogates (none of which contained added "dispersant, " i.e., silica nanoparticles). All ten were found to contain between 0.2% -5% silicon (in bulk); four of these contained an amount of silicon in the same range as the attack samples. The NAS committee wrote that the bulk silicon analyses indicate that it is possible to prepare spores with high silicon content without adding a dispersant, but that, when analyzed for silicon in the spore coat, none of the FBI samples were similar to the attack samples with respect to either the amount of silicon per spore in the coat, or the fraction of spores containing any silicon in the coat 63 . Thus, it is possible that most of the silicon in the four samples with high silicon content was extra-sporular, like that in the NY Post sample
64
; there is no evidence that it was naturally incorporated. The methods of preparation of these four samples, including addition of any substances other than silica particles, were not described to the NAS 65 . The NAS Report noted that they were not provided with all of the preparation procedures used 66 ; they "sought, but could not obtain, a detailed explanation of the thought process that went into selection of the DPG [Dugway] methods…it was not clear to the committee how the subset of surrogate preparation methods was selected and whether these choices were based on an understanding informed by the investigation or on other assumptions about the approach taken to produce the evidentiary materials 67 . " In light of all the open questions, it is strange that a "Red Team, " convened at Quantico on March 13, 2007, recommended that the FBI pursue no further research on the silicon in the letter powders 68 .
A new book 69 edited by Bruce Budowle of the FBI and others suggests a reason why the FBI may have wished to avoid the silicon question: "if the estimates of silicon concentrations in the Amerithrax spores are correct, they are not consistent with our current understanding of silica deposition, or those materials must have indeed been produced under an unusual set of conditions. If the latter were true, the silica [sic] evidence might provide a significant bound on the credible growth and production scenarios that would be consistent with the prosecution narrative in this case. "
It has usually been assumed that any intentional additive containing silicon must have been intended to increase the dispersibility of the attack spores 70 . In reporting their work to the FBI the Sandia scientists wrote that "the silicon and oxygen found on the spore coat are difficult to explain as an intentional addition to the spores, mainly because of their location on the spore coat, which surrounds the spore core and is surrounded or encased by the exosporium 71 ". However, the spore coat of Bacilli, not the exosporium, is the effective surface of the spore; it is at the spore coat, not the exosporium, that large molecules (mol. wt. about 16,000 and above) are totally excluded from the spore 72 , and the coat is an important factor in spore resistance to toxic chemicals 73 . The effects that a silicon compound on the spore coat may have on spore properties, including dispersibility 74 , cannot be assumed.
Presumably for this reason, an effort to determine the dispersibility of the attack spores by direct measurement was undertaken by Michael Kuhlman of Battelle Memorial Institute. Sometime between October 17-23, 2001, he measured the particle size distributions of an aerosolized Daschle sample and later, of a Leahy sample and of several B. subtilis globigii spore samples made at Battelle using standard methods, with no milling or other processing 75 . He found them all to be similar. The particle sizes in all cases had bimodal distributions; for the Daschle sample, surprisingly, only 0.05 % of the mass had a diameter of 2 micrometers or less, and 0.9% had a 10 micrometer diameter or less; the Leahy sample had ten times more particles in this respirable range. The NAS Report took the Battelle data to indicate that "powders with dispersion characteristics similar to those of the letter materials could be made without the addition of a dispersant 76 . " However, there is reason to question whether the attack samples were in pristine condition when these measurements were carried out, or whether Battelle had autoclaved them first, which might have caused clumping. 83. FBI document B1M7, pp. 93-94, table containing all the data; analyses of the ten Dugway surrogates were exceptional, indicating very small amounts of tin, but the significance of these findings is uncertain because of insufficient information; all the Dugway values observed are very close to those for an undefined "STD" (B1M1, p. 83). The Dugway sample data are also presented in B1M7 pp. 27-28, where it is noted that procedural problems in analysis of Dugway samples K1662 and K1668, the two with the highest silicon and tin analyses, "likely resulted in inflated concentrations".
84. Table 1 shows that iron content does not appear to be correlated with silicon content. 77 describes an argument at a meeting on October 22, 2001 involving the FBI laboratory, scientists from the Battelle Memorial Institute, and scientists from the Army. The Army scientists were telling the FBI that the attack powder was "extremely rarified and dangerous, " while Michael Kuhlman of Battelle "was allegedly saying that the anthrax was ten to fifty times less potent than the Army was claiming….One Army official is said to have blown up…at the meeting, saying to the Battelle man, 'Goddamn it, you stuck your anthrax in an autoclave, and you turned it into hockey pucks. '" The FBI's conclusion that the silicon content of the attack anthrax had nothing to do with its dispersibility remains unproven. , but these tended to be on 'large' pieces within the sample. Many of the smaller pieces within the sample exhibited the main peak associated with silicon. It appears that silicon (not bonded to oxygen or other elements) is present in many areas of this sample 78 ". When the NAS committee asked the FBI about this last point, the FBI answered that the presence of "reduced silicon" was "just an observation 79 ". Exactly what AFIP meant by "not bonded to oxygen or other elements" is uncertain, but a possible guess is "not bonded to oxygen or other elements we looked for. " Surely they did not mean to imply that elemental silicon was present. In any case, an explanation is needed for the fact that the NY Post sample contains two different chemical forms of silicon.
Richard Preston's The Demon in the Freezer
Since we now know from the Sandia work that the NY Post and Daschle spores, in isolation, are elementally indistinguishable, the "large" pieces in the NY Post sample that exhibited the same elements as the Daschle sample in the AFIP analyses must have been spore aggregates. The "smaller pieces, " which contain most of the silicon in the NY Post sample, probably include cellular debris, absent in the more highly-purified Senate samples but present as extra-sporular material in the NY Post preparation. More on this below.
Besides silicon, an even more unusual element was found in the attack anthrax: tin (Sn). The Sandia group found tin 80 in the 10-20 nm continuous Si-O layer surrounding the spore coats of all the attack samples, but not in any of the surrogate samples they studied, including ten made at Dugway, or in samples that contained naturallyincorporated Si-O on the spore coat 81 . The presence of these unusual elements may be a fingerprint, they wrote. But the NAS committee "was never shown any evidence to indicate that this possibility was pursued further or that these discussions led to any conclusions about the source of material or production methods 82 . "
FBI documents released in February, 2011 reveal that in early 2002, the FBI laboratories also carried out extensive elemental analyses of the attack samples and of various other spore preparations, including the same ten surrogates made at Dugway. Using inductively coupled plasma optical emission spectroscopy (ICP-OES), a sensitive method, they found tin in the attack samples, but no tin in other spore preparations or in media 83 . Table 1 contains some of the FBI data. The amounts of silicon and tin appear to be related: the more of one, the more of the other. This suggests a process that involved both silicon and tin 84 . There is no tin in the simulant to which silica particles had been added, and no silicon or tin in the simulant without added silica, or in the contents of flask RMR 1029 85 . The levels of other elements are reflective of media components (which do not include tin), as can be seen by comparing Table 2 , which shows elemental analyses determined by ICP-OES for nine Bacillus spore samples prepared by different methods
86
. Neither silicon nor tin was detectable in any of the samples. Comparing Tables  1 and 2 it is immediately obvious that the attack powders are in a league of their own as far as the elemental forensic evidence is concerned. Any meaningful reverse engineering studies would have to deliberately include compounds containing silicon and tin if there were any hope of reproducing the attack powders. Using protocols that do not add silicon or tin would be quite meaningless. It is essential to learn whether the FBI labs tried to add tin to their preparations.
All the evidence in the public domain is consistent with the concept that the spore coats of the attack anthrax were silicone-coated. Silicone polymers are typically formed by hydrolysis of a silicon compound such as dimethyldichlorosilane 87 (or other silanes with similar substituents) 88 , which contains no oxygen. Hydrolysis replaces the chlorine atoms with oxygen to form dimethylsilanol, which polymerizes spontaneously to form polydimethylsiloxane, containing silicon and oxygen in equal amounts. The polydimethylsiloxane 89 chains can then be cross-linked ("cured") to form a three-dimensional silicone coating for encapsulation. This step requires an organotin catalyst 90,91 such as a dibutyltin dicarboxylate 92 .
A procedure of this kind can be envisioned for encapsulating B. anthracis spores. Silane monomers like dimethyldichlorosilane are low-molecular-weight liquids that probably can penetrate the exosporium 93 , the loose-fitting membrane sac that encloses the spore. If silane monomers were added to a suspension of dry spores in an organic solvent, the silane would not contact moisture until it reached the spore coat, where residual moisture diffusing from the core inside the spore 94 would cause hydrolysis, followed by polymerization at the spore coat. The polysiloxane chains that would be formed at the spore coat could then be cross-linked to encapsulate the spore. This step would require continued diffusion of moisture from inside the spore, as well as an organotin catalyst. Organotins have low solubility in water but, like silanes, are soluble in organic solvents such as ether, carbon tetrachloride, etc 95 . The ratio of tin to silicon in the attack spores is "about right" for a tin catalyst used to produce a silicone coating, according to a chemist in the field 96 .
Before contacting moisture, chlorosilane compounds react readily with various functional groups in organic materials (e.g., amino groups, alcohols, carboxylic acid groups, etc.) that would be found in cellular debris. If the cellular debris contained no moisture, the result would be "silylation" of the material, i.e., addition of a silicon atom (but no new oxygen atom) at each silylated site. The silylated material would be found in the extrasporular material such as observed in the NY Post samplethe "smaller pieces. " Alternatively, if the cellular debris in the dried NY Post sample retains some moisture, chlorosilane molecules would react as they do at the spore coat, hydrolyzing and then polymerizing to form clumps of polysiloxane, a high-molecular-weight material that would not be soluble. The extrasporular material may be a mixture of these possibilities. The smaller pieces that "exhibited the main peak associated with silicon,…not bonded to oxygen or other elements" would be the silylated areas, containing Si-O-C or Si-N-C bonds, not the O-rich Si-O-Si-O bonds that form the backbone of polysiloxane polymers. These different bonds, which can be distinguished by spectroscopic methods 97 , would explain the AFIP observations.
Although a process of this type is not known to have been applied to bacterial spores, methods have been developed to encapsulate biologicals with silicone polymers that confer high stability while protecting biological activity 98 . Polydimethylsiloxane has been used in some pharmaceutical coating materials for years, even though a toxic material, organotin, is employed as catalyst in its production 99 .
Microencapsulation can provide protection from the environment and better dispersibility and flowability 100 . The polydimethylsiloxanes have a low surface tension that produces "very hydrophobic films and a surface with good release properties, particularly if the film is cured… surface tension is also in the most promising range considered for biocompatible elastomers 101 . "
Inorganic tin compounds are genotoxic to bacteria 102 ; organotins are increasingly toxic; triorganotins are used as general biocides 103 . The potential toxicity of tin compounds underlines the probability that tin was not added to the attack spores during their growth, but rather, during post-production treatment of the spores.
